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Although economic historians have traditionally studied international 
trade policies in both economic and political terms, it has only been 
within the last decade that trade economists have manifested much more 
than casual interest in this approach.’ Over a dozen articles or papers 
have been written since 1974 in which trade economists have analyzed in 
quantitative terms the relationship between the level of protection (or a 
change in the level) afforded different industries or income classes and 
various political and economic characteristics of  these sectors or groups 
that appear to influence the level of protection.*  This greater attention to 
the political economy of  protectionism is only one indication of  the 
growing interest by economists in public choice-a  subject that Mueller 
(1976)  defines as the  application of  economics to political  science. 
According to Mueller public choice developed as a separate field in 
response to the issues raised by Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), and 
Arrow (1951) in their pioneering work on social welfare and also in 
response to the explorations in the 1940s and 1950s of  the conditions in 
which the free market mechanism fails to achieve a Pareto-optimum 
allocation of  resources. 
Robert E. Baldwin is the F. W. Taussig Research Professor of Economics at the Univer- 
sity of  Wisconsin-Madison.  Among his recent articles is “Welfare Effects on the United 
States of  a Significant Multilateral Tariff Reduction” (with J. H.  Mutti and J. D. Richard- 
son), Journal of  International Economics, August 1980. His study The Political Economy of 
U.S.  Import Policy will be published in 1983. 
The author is grateful for the valuable comments  of the discussants and other conference 
participants and especially for Jagdish Bhagwati‘s help in tightening up the paper. Thanks 
are due to the Office on Foreign Economic Research, United States Department of  Labor, 
and the World Bank for financial  support in undertaking the research underlying this paper. 
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10.1  Welfare Economics: Bergson, Samuelson, Arrow, et al. 
A discussion of the political economy of trade policy can usefully begin 
by placing the subject in the framework established by  Bergson and 
Samuelson for analyzing social welfare. The Bergson-Samuelson for- 
mulation of  the social welfare function makes a clear-cut distinction 
between  individual tastes or preferences  for goods and services and 
individual values relating to general  standards of  equity or to other 
ethical judgments. These authors also assume that an individual’s  prefer- 
ences for economic goods and services depend only upon his own con- 
sumption of  these items and not upon what other individuals consume. 
Thus social welfare (W)  is written as 
W = W[  U’(Xi, . . . ,  xi;  v:,  . . .  ,  VL),  . . . 
Us(x:,  . . ., xi;  v;,  . . . ,  VS,)], 
where the U terms represent ordinal utility measures for the  s individuals, 
the X terms stand for the n  commodities, and the V terms stand for the rn 
productive services. 
As Samuelson points out, the social welfare function characterizes 
some set of  ethical beliefs that permits  an unequivocal answer as to 
whether  one configuration of  the economic system is  “better” than, 
“worse” than, or “indifferent” to any other.3  Bergson also stresses that 
the social welfare function rests on ethical   rite ria.^ Neither author ana- 
lyzes in any detail the nature of the value judgments nor how the commu- 
nity selects a particular social welfare function. Bergson utilizes an egali- 
tarian welfare function to indicate how  a maximum welfare position 
would be determined, but he points out that any set of value propositions 
sufficient to evaluate all alternatives could be used. He states that the 
determination of prevailing values for a given community is a proper and 
necessary task  for  economists but  does  not  pursue  this  topic  at  all 
him~elf.~  With regard to the manner of selection of the welfare function, 
Bergson simply assumes-as  Arrow notes-that  there is a universally 
accepted  ordering  of  different  possible welfare  distributions  in  any 
situation.6 
The manner in which the social welfare function is used to determine a 
maximum social welfare point under a given set of  economic circum- 
stances is illustrated in figure 10.1’. Letting U1 and U2  be ordinal utility 
indices for individuals 1 and 2 (assumed for simplicity to be the entire 
community), suppose that the curve AA’ represent the free trade utility- 
possibility function for the community with its given set of  individual 
preferences, factor supplies, and technical production constraints. The 
necessary (but not sufficient)  conditions for maximizing social welfare are 






these enable one to reduce the level of  indeterminacy in the system to 
points along the utility-possibility  frontier. Next, the social welfare func- 
tion is depicted in the figure by  means of  a set of  social indifference 
contours, along any one of  which, e.g., ii‘,  social welfare is constant. 
Since individuals are assumed to “count,”  the indifference contours 
cannot intersect  and must  slope downward,  although  their  absolute 
slopes at any point are arbitrary. Obviously social welfare is maximized at 
the point of  tangency between a social welfare contour and the utility- 
possibility curve. At the tangency point it is ethically judged that the 
marginal social utility of income (or of any commodity) is the same for the 
two individuals. 
Arrow defines the social welfare function somewhat differently from 
Bergson and Samuelson. He first points out that the distinction between 
tastes and ethical values is by no means clear-cut.8  To use his examples, 
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there is little difference between the pleasure derived from one’s own 
lawn and from one’s neighbor’s lawn or between an individual’s dislike of 
having his grounds ruined  by  factory smoke and his distaste for the 
existence of  heathenism  in some distant  area.  Consequently,  Arrow 
views each individual as ordering not only the various amounts of  each 
type of commodity he may consume as well as of the labor he may supply 
but the amounts of both private and collectively consumed goods in every 
one else’s hands. Each of these distributions of  goods and services, i.e., 
each social state, is also ordered as directly represented rather than by 
using the notion of  a utility function. He then defines a social welfare 
function as a process or rule which, for each individual ordering  of 
alternative social states, gives a corresponding social ordering of  these 
social ~tates.~  As Arrow points out, whereas Bergson seeks to locate 
social values in welfare judgments by individuals, he locates them in the 
actions taken through the rules society uses for making social decisions.Io 
The problem posed by Arrow on the basis of this definition of  a social 
welfare function is  whether a rule exists for passing from individual 
orderings of  social states to a social ordering without violating such 
reasonable conditions as that the rule not be imposed or dictatorial and 
that it give a consistent ordering of  all feasible alternatives. He discov- 
ered that in general it was not possible to find such a rule.  Majority 
voting, for example, can lead to results that violate the transitivity condi- 
tion. Only if  at least a majority of individuals have the same ordering of 
social alternatives or if  individual orderings are single-peaked will major- 
ity voting always produce a social ordering that meets these conditions. 
An advantage of  the Bergson-Samuelson formulation of  welfare eco- 
nomics is that there is scope for the economist to make policy recom- 
mendations without it being necessary to inquire into a community’s 
ethical standards or to know the process by which these standards are 
implemented. If  a particular policy, e.g., free trade, gives a situation 
utility-possibility  function entirely outside another policy, e.g., no trade, 
then the first policy will yield a point on a higher social welfare contour 
than the second policy no matter what the shape of  the social welfare 
contours.  Since, however,  the implementation  of  a particular  policy 
places the economy at some specific  point on a situation utility-possibility 
function, redistributions of welfare along such a function must be permit- 
ted for this statement to have validity. 
10.2  The Positive Theory of Trade Policy Determination 
The contributions of  Bergson, Samuelson, and Arrow prompted the 
developments that led, in particular, to the consideration of  the related 
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whether  Pareto-efficient  resource-allocational policies,  delineated as 
such by economic analysis, would in fact be adopted under the political 
processes characterizing modern industrial democracies. 
Writers pursuing the latter line of  thought, e.g., Downs (1957) and 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), postulate that voters and their elected 
representatives pursue their own self-interest in the political marketplace 
just  as they do in the economic marketplace.  The difference is that 
preferences are expressed by ballot box voting rather than dollar voting. 
In applying this approach to trade policy, economists generally hy- 
pothesize producers and particular income groups to be the demanders of 
protectionism who seek to maximize the present value of  the additional 
income they can obtain by reducing imports. Elected representatives (or 
the citizens themselves, if  there is direct voting) are regarded  as the 
suppliers of  protection who also seek to maximize their own welfare. 
Under conditions of perfect competition in political markets this implies 
that they maximize their chances of  election. 
10.2.1  Perfect Markets 
An important conclusion from this economic approach to political 
decision making is that  Pareto-efficient policies will  be implemented 
under  majority  rule  provided that such conditions prevail as perfect 
information, no voting costs, and the absence of any costs of  redistribut- 
ing income." Suppose, for example, that the foreign offer curve facing a 
country shifts outward and thereby enables the country to expand its 
consumption possibilities. In a vote between a tariff policy that restricts 
the consumption possibilities to its initial set and a free trade policy that 
enlarges this set, the latter policy will be selected, since it is possible to 
make a majority of  voters (or even all voters) better off under the free 
trade policy than they are initially. However, in selecting a particular 
point among the many on the free trade utility-possibility frontier on the 
basis of  majority rule, the cycling problem noted by Arrow can arise for 
the community. Each individual will order the alternative social states 
along this frontier on the basis of  the utility he  obtains from each. 
However, while individual preferences are transitive, majority voting will 
not in general yield transitive social preferences.  If  all points on the 
utility-possibility  functions are to be considered, the only way out of the 
difficulty without  abandoning majority  rule is, as Arrow has shown, 
either to assume a universally-agreed-upon ordering of  all welfare dis- 
tributions (the Bergson approach) or at least to assume that a majority of 
voters  possess  identical  orderings  of  these  distributions.  The latter 
approach means that the social welfare function is dictatorial; on the 
other hand, in accepting majority voting as the selection rule, the condi- 
tion of  nondictatorship loses its intrinsic desirability.I2 268  Robert E. Baldwin 
10.2.2  Redistribution Limitations 
Those who apply public choice theory to trade policy generally rule out 
the possibility of  redistribution along a utility-possibility  frontier. They 
assume in their analyses that the selection of  a particular point on the 
frontier results from the operation of market forces as modified by trade 
taxes and as influenced by individual tastes and the prevailing distribution 
of productive  factor^.'^ This, for example, is the framework in which the 
Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem is sometimes utilized to account for 
protectionism  in  a capital-abundant  economy. Since in  the  standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  trade model with two factors (capital and 
labor), two goods, and fixed trading terms a tariff will raise the real return 
to labor, protectionism will emerge if  workers have more voting power 
than  capitalist^.'^ 
But labor could always improve any position it attains under protec- 
tionism by  permitting free trade and then redistributing income in its 
favor through lump-sum taxes that it could impose by  majority voting. 
However, this possibility usually  is  not  mentioned  in  discussing this 
application of  economics to the politics of  protection. Likewise, writers 
who analyze protection  to particular industries and who assume that 
factors are industry-specific  in the short run, generally do not introduce 
the possibility of free trade coupled with lump-sum redistribution to the 
factors in the industry as an option to be explained. 
While most countries have some forms of  automatic compensation to 
factors adversely affected by imports such as extended unemployment 
compensation,  retraining  payments,  migration  allowances,  technical 
assistance, and governmental purchasing and scrapping of excess capital 
equipment, they usually do not fully compensate for the economic loss to 
these factors. Moreover, the measures are used to supplement protection 
from imports that takes the form of higher duties or quotas rather than to 
substitute for protectionism. Just why this is so is itself an important topic 
for investigation within a political economy framework. Some comments 
are made about this matter in the next section when discussing possible 
extensions of  the usual analysis. The point here is simply that although 
the assumption made by previous writers in this field concerning limited 
redistribution possibilities may be consistent with the actual policies of 
most  governments, it  is  a  severe restriction  upon  first-best welfare 
analysis. 
10.2.3  Information and Voting Costs 
Besides generally ruling out the possibility of  income redistribution 
within the context of free trade or protectionism, writers in the field also 
focus on the existence of various other imperfections in political markets 
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through the voting process. Information costs and costs of  registering 
one’s preferences through the voting process are two sources of  such 
imperfections. 
For example ,  in an environment of imperfect information some con- 
sumers may be unaware that the prices of  an imported product and its 
domestic substitute have risen in  response  to a higher import  duty. 
Moreover, if the increase in prices is modest compared with their budget 
outlays on the items, it may not be rational for these consumers to invest 
the time and funds to find out about the cause of the price rises in order to 
try to reverse these increases through the political process. Even if  a 
consumer is aware of the reason for the price increases, he may find that 
the costs of  registering his opposition through the political process are 
greater than his resultant loss in consumer welfare. 
The existence of  these types of  costs together with the point that the 
welfare losses from protecting a particular industry are so widely dis- 
persed that the loss to any one consumer is small were first emphasized by 
Downs (1957) as an explanation of why producers succeeded in obtaining 
protection from imports. 
10.2.4  Elected Representatives and Political Parties 
Another type of  imperfection in political markets introduced in the 
literature on the subject concerns the fact that representative democracy 
with political parties prevails rather than direct democracy. If  political 
markets operate perfectly,  the actions of  elected officials will  merely 
reflect the wishes of  the voters. For otherwise new candidates will enter 
the market and unseat existing representatives of  the voters. However, 
the existence of  imperfections that provide incumbents with special elec- 
tion advantages and make it very costly for new candidates to make their 
views widely known modifies this conclusion and increases the possibility 
that the wishes of  a majority of  the voters will not be carried out. 
Brock and Magee (1974, 1980) have utilized game theory to analyze 
the manner in which one political party selects a particular trade policy 
and how a second party reacts to this choice. For example, they pose the 
problem  of  choosing preelection  tariff positions by  a protariff  and a 
free-trade party in the following way. The protariff party maximizes its 
probability of  election by increasing the level of  protection it supports 
until the positive marginal effect on the party’s election probability from 
the increased resources given by the protectionist lobby is just offset by 
the negative effect of  lost voters and resource flows from free traders to 
the free-trade party. The free-trade party, on the other hand, chooses a 
position that minimizes the election chances of  the protectionist party. 
Thus it will lower its tariff below the other party’s tariff until the marginal 
positive effect on its election probability from resources and votes pro- 
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funds flowing from the protectionist lobby to the protariff party. Assum- 
ing equilibrium is of  the simple Cournot-Nash variety, they are able to 
derive such results as: (1) In the neighborhood of equilibrium, one party 
will become more protectionist when the second does, but the second 
party will adopt a more liberal position when the first party becomes more 
protectionist. (2) If  the protectionist lobby becomes more powerful, it is 
not inevitable that both parties will become more protectionist; one of 
the parties may favor a lower tariff. 
10.2.5  The Free-Rider and Externality Problems 
Still  another  type  of  imperfection  in  the  operation  of  political- 
economic markets emphasized by writers in this field, e.g., Olson (1965) 
and Pincus (1972, 1975), is the free-rider problem that is associated with 
the provision of  a public good. A tariff (or the absence of  one) has the 
characteristic of a public good in that a beneficiary from a tariff cannot be 
excluded from the benefits, even though he does not contribute to the 
costs of providing the tariff. For example, a firm in a protected industry 
benefits even if  it does not contribute to the lobbying efforts required to 
secure the protection. Thus there is an incentive for each firm not to 
reveal its true preferences regarding its benefits in the hope that others 
will pay the lobbying costs. Olson argues that the voluntary formation of 
an effective lobbying group is more likely if  the group is small and if  the 
benefits are unevenly distributed, since under these circumstances the 
benefits to each individual member, or at least one member, increa~e.'~ 
Pincus adds that the costs of  coordinating and monitoring a pressure 
group tend to reduce lobbying activity if  an industry is widely dispersed 
geographically. 
This framework has been applied to explain both why protectionism 
exists despite the fact that consumers represent a majority of  voters as 
well  as why  some industries are more highly  protected than  others. 
Consumers are too numerous and widely dispersed for effective liberal- 
trade pressure groups representing their interests to be formed. While 
these factors generally do not prevent producers from organizing into 
pressure  groups, one does expect that pressure  groups will  be  more 
effective if  the industries they represent are characterized by high levels 
of firm and geographic concentration. However, Olson notes a possible 
exception.  Some groups provide  both private  and public goods and 
collect funds for organizing and lobbying from the sale of  the private 
good. For example, a group may sell a magazine or journal that provides 
helpful technical information to its members. Consequently, even though 
the structure of  an industry appears unfavorable for organizing into an 
effective  pressure group, it may in fact be well organized for this reason.16 
While a tariff has the public good characteristic that all producers in a 
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do or do not contribute to the costs of  obtaining protection, it lacks the 
characteristic of a pure public good that increases in benefits to one 
producer do not reduce the benefits to other producers. The producer 
benefits  from  protection  mainly  take  the  form  of  temporary  rents, 
although expansion in the protected sector may also increase long-run 
returns to some factors. The distribution of these benefits among existing 
producers depends upon how rapidly and to what extent they respond on 
the supply side as well as on how fast new domestic competitors take 
advantage of the enhanced profit opportunities. In deciding how much to 
invest in lobbying activities, an individual producer must estimate the 
supply response of others as well as his own in order to be sure he earns at 
least the market rate on his rent-seeking investment. Even if  there is only 
one producer, he must be concerned with the possibility that his lobbying 
investment will create profit opportunities so attractive that other firms 
will enter the market and prevent him from earning an acceptable return 
on his lobbying activities. In other words, just as a protective duty is no 
guarantee that individual entrepreneurs in an infant industry will under- 
take greater investments in acquiring technological knowledge, so too is 
the existence of net benefits from lobbying not a guarantee that the rent 
seeking will be undertaken. 
This externality problem may in part explain why protectionist efforts 
over the last fifty years have usually focused on depressed industries. It is 
not rational for capitalists outside such an industry or even within the 
industry to invest in new productive capacity nor for outside workers to 
seek employment in the sector if  a tariff increase occurs that still leaves 
the rate of  return on investment and the wage rate below what they are 
generally. Those involved in such an industry know that the distribution 
of rents on existing physical and human capital in the industry is likely to 
be closely related to existing factor supplies and can be more certain of 
their return from such a tariff. 
10.3  Modifying the Positive Theory of Trade Policy Determination: 
Social Values and Interpersonal Effects 
The public choice theory of trade policy determination reviewed above 
is based on the assumptions that all individuals in the economy seek to 
maximize their welfare and that individual welfare depends only upon the 
goods and services a person consumes directly. 
However, it is evident that considerations of  equity and social justice 
may well affect policy choices. Thus the fact that low-income workers, 
including women and migrants, are substantially employed in textiles 
may account partly for the protection granted to this industry in some of 
the developed countries. The desire to protect the incomes of  the under- 
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location (e.g., depressed regions), can thus well provide an input into the 
tariff-making process, though, it must be stressed, this does not in itself 
explain the choice of  tariff protection rather than other policy instru- 
ments in granting this element of redistribution to the concerned group. 
Among the many studies of  tariff making or tariff reduction that have 
stressed this issue, one may include Cheh (1974), Caves (1976), Helleiner 
(1977), and Anderson (1978). Corden (1974, p. 107) has suggested that 
societies may have a “conservative welfare function” which requires that 
trade policy  should be  implemented  so  as to avoid “any  significant 
reductions in real incomes of any significant section of the c~mmunity.”’~ 
If  altruistic notions do contribute to protection, one may well ask what 
prompts such altruism. Arrow (1975) gives three reasons why an indi- 
vidual undertakes actions that are, or seem to be, expressions of altruism. 
First, the welfare of the individual may depend not only on the goods he 
consumes but  also on the economic welfare of  others. An altruistic 
relationship exists if the individual’s  welfare decreases when the welfare 
of  others decreases.18  As will be recalled, interpersonal relationships of 
this type are excluded from the Bergerson-Samuelson formulation of the 
social welfare function, though not from Arrow’s. Second, not only may 
the individual derive satisfaction from seeing someone else’s satisfaction 
increased, but also he may gain satisfaction from the fact that he himself 
has contributed to that satisfaction. Third, an individual may be moti- 
vated entirely by his own egotistic satisfaction, but “there is an implicit 
social contract that each performs duties for others in a way calculated to 
enhance the satisfaction of  all”-an  argument that implies enlightened 
self-interest.  l9 
Of these reasons for altruistic behavior, the last may have particular 
relevance to protectionist  policies. Thus it may  be that an individual 
supports a tariff increase outside his own industry because he thinks this 
action will enhance his own chances of  receiving tariff protection should 
his industry come under severe import competition in the future. It is this 
idea that serves as the basis for regarding tariffs as a type of  insurance 
policy (see Corden 1974, pp. 320-21;  Cassing 1980,  pp. 396-97). Workers 
and capitalowners who are risk-adverse wish to avoid human and physical 
capital losses due to sudden and significant increases in imports that 
compete with the domestic products they produce. However, private 
markets to insure against this risk fail to exist, apparently for reasons of 
inadequate data or “moral hazard.” The import relief legislation involv- 
ing recommendations from the International Trade Commission can, for 
example, be  viewed  as a means of  providing the desired insurance. 
However, if  this view is adopted, one is left guessing why  the implicit 
contractual behavior agreed upon by different industry groups chooses 
tariffs as the method of providing relief against import competition since 
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the implicit contractual arrangements embracing other groups with a 
political role. 
Moreover, protection may well reflect broader goals, such as those 
analyzed by  Johnson (1960) in his seminal analysis of  the “scientific 
tariff” where he analyzed the optimal tariff structure to promote collec- 
tive goals such as industrialization, self-sufficiency, “a way of  life,” and 
military preparedness.*O  While Johnson considers the question of optimal 
tariff structures to reflect these goals at minimal cost, the question as to 
whether protection or alternative policy interventions will be the least- 
cost policies to adopt in pursuit of  such goals is explored in other papers 
by Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969). 
That altruism, a Bergsonian approach, and the pure public-choice- 
theoretic solution can result in  different tariff  outcomes may now be 
simply illustrated. Thus, in figure 10.2, AB is the production possibility 
curve for goods XI and X2.  A shift in the terms of trade of this small, open 
2 x 2 economy will shift production from P to Po*. The optimal solution, 
in Paretian economic terms, is then at Po* with zero tariff. It is also the 
pure public-choice-theoretic majority-rule solution under the ideal re- 
strictions set out in  section  10.2. But  suppose now  that  there  is  an 
“altruistic,” “empathetic” feeling toward labor in this model. And depict 
the  real  wages of  labor  in  the lower  RHS  quadrant. There,  as  the 
production  of  XI  (the K-intensive good) falls with the imposition of 
successively higher tariffs which raise the relative price of  good X2,  the 
real wages of  labor rise A la the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Therefore 
an “altruistic” tariff (tA)  may be depicted as that which brings production 
to PA  and real wages up from Wo to WA. On the other hand, one may 
envisage a government which instead maximizes a quasi-Bergson social 
welfare function such as that represented in  the lower LHS quadrant. 
This social welfare function is defined directly on wage and rental in- 
comes in the 2 x 2 model, rather than on the utilities of  the wage and 
rental earners as in the classic Bergsonian social welfare function. The 
tangency of  the social indifference contour with the wage-rental locus in 
the lower LHS quadrant then determines the corresponding production 
at PB and the associated “Bergsonian” tariff rate tg.21 
10.4  Lobbying-determined Protection Reflecting Foregoing 
Considerations 
The degree of  protection resulting from the foregoing considerations 
can be formally analyzed along the lines of figure 10.3. Let OtoV be the 
“cost of lobbying’’  curve, reflecting the dollar cost of securing increasing 
levels of tariff protection by a lobby. Such a curve will reflect factors such 
as that the willingness of elected officials to grant additional protection to 
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tionism already given to the industry; (2) positively associated with the 
magnitude  of  producer  lobbying  expenditures  (both  of  these  rela- 
tionships are part of  the Brock-Magee model); and (3) positively corre- 
lated with the degree to which economic conditions in the industry match 
either the altruistic values or the social insurance desires of  the voters. 
Not only are industry lobbying funds provided to candidates so that 
voters can be informed about how they have been, or will be, helped by 
the candidates, but also they are spent by an industry to convince voters 
that the industry's condition or cause of  injury merits assistance on such 
grounds as fairness and equity. In other words, lobbying funds deployed 
by an industry will tend to reflect, in varying degrees, the diverse factors 
that have been discussed earlier in this paper. Reflecting the fact there- 
fore that altruism may result in some protection at zero or negligible cost, 
the OtoV curve has the stretch Oto along the horizontal axis. 275  Political Economy of  Protectionism 
t0  t  1  t2  Change in tariff level  0 
Fig. 10.3 
The curve OQS in figure 10.3, on the other hand, reflects the benefits 
from tariff protection. These are assumed to increase until they level out 
at Q with maximal protection implied by the prohibitive tariff. 
The equilibrium, endogenous tariff then emerges in the usual profit- 
maximizing fashion.  That is, the industry in  question will select the 
particular lobbying-expenditure level at which the additional cost of an 
increment in the tariff, i.e., the marginal cost of  a tariff increase, is just 
equal to the marginal revenue from the tariff increase. The expenditure 
level that maximizes the industry’s net benefits is Oe2 in figure 10.3, and 
the associated tariff increase is Or2.** 
Other industries that may or may not be faced with a recent decline in 
the foreign import supply curve will have similarly shaped gross benefits 
curves indicating the increase in producer surplus associated with further 
increases in any existing tariffs and also similarly shaped voter-support 
curves indicating the highest duty increases obtainable by the industry at 276  Robert E. Baldwin 
various expenditure levels. For many industries the voter-support curve 
may lie entirely above the benefits curve so that no duty change will be 
supported. Another possibility is that the voter curve, though intersect- 
ing the tariff-increase axis at a positive level, rises more rapidly than the 
benefit curve. In this case the best policy for the industry to follow is not 
to lobby at all.= It may also be the case that the voter-support curves for 
different industries are not independent of  each voter. For example, if 
voters have recently supported tariff increases in  other industries, the 
voter-support curve for  the industry depicted  in  figure  10.3 may  lie 
further to the left than if  there had not been these increases. 
The voter-support curve of  an industry receiving protection may also 
rise over time (and thus lead to a lower optimal tariff increase for the 
industry) as voters learn from their experiences with a higher tariff. The 
industry may not live up to its promise to become internationally com- 
petitive  again or the workers may  not  appear to be so  deserving of 
assistance as voters learn more about them after the initial duty rise. It is 
for such reasons that import protection for a particular industry is often 
only temporary. But the model can also account for indefinite increases in 
protection. The information disbursed by an industry concerning why it 
deserves assistance may remain valid indefinitely  in the minds of voters or 
else never be disproved by information from other sources.24 
Many variations and extensions on the analysis presented thus far 
suggest themselve~.~~  One would be  to introduce  various degrees of 
imperfection in political markets. For example, on the basis of his control 
of  a party’s political mechanisms or his greater previous political expo- 
sure, the incumbent may be able to obtain a higher duty for an industry 
than any alternative candidate who is given the same amount of campaign 
funds. In this case the official will share in the producer surplus generated 
by the tariff increase by becoming the recipient, say, of  campaign con- 
tributions that reduce the need for the person to campaign as hard as 
would otherwise be necessary. Another modification would be to intro- 
duce interindustry differences in the ability to raise lobbying funds from 
firms and workers. Because of the free-rider problem, many industries, 
for example, may not be able to undertake the expenditures needed to 
maximize net benefits. 
More  broadly,  investigations are needed  concerning the  different 
forms of assistance received by industries. Why is one industry helped by 
the imposition of quotas while another only receives tariff protection or 
perhaps extended unemployment  insurance?  Or why  is  one industry 
aided directly by  subsidies in various forms and another indirectly by 
import protection? The reasons the political process does not yield the 
free trade solution coupled with income transfers to compensate indi- 
viduals who lose under this policy must also be studied and empirically 
tested. 277  Political Economy of  Protectionism 
Although this last question is worthy in itself of a separate paper, a few 
economic and political reasons come immediately to mind. First, under 
the free trade-income subsidy approach, it would be necessary to set up a 
costly administrative mechanism both for determining just which firms 
and what workers are injured by cheaper imports as well as the extent of 
their income loss and for channeling the appropriate compensation to 
them. On the other hand, a tariff increase that in part offsets a decrease in 
import prices partially compensates injured individuals through the op- 
eration of the price system. However, the drawbacks of  a tariff increase 
as a compensation means are that it provides extra income for those who 
may not be very seriously injured by the fall in import prices and does not 
help those who are too inefficient to remain in the industry with only a 
partial reversal of the price decline. 
The  unfavorable  experience  with  actual  income-compensating 
schemes (in contrast to the ideal lump-sum redistribution arrangements 
assumed in welfare economics) may help account for the failure of  the 
free trade-income  subsidy approach to be extensively implemented. For 
example, there is evidence suggesting that the special unemployment 
benefits extended to trade-displaced workers in the United States may 
make employers more willing to lay off workers and may encourage those 
who do lose their jobs to remain unemployed for longer periods than 
otherwise.%  Such behavior tends to turn both government officials and 
the general public against this approach. The tariff-raising method also 
has the deficiency that firms may lay off workers and reduce their effi- 
ciency-increasing efforts in the expectation of  receiving import protec- 
tion, but such abuses are probably politically less transparent than those 
associated with direct income payments. 
Gainers from free trade also may be reluctant  to support income- 
compensating measures because they are unsure of the tax burden they 
will bear under these schemes. If, in response to a decrease in the price of 
an import good, a tariff is introduced that completely restores the initial 
price, a voter whose money income is unaffected by the change knows 
that he will be no worse off than before the price decline even if  he does 
not receive any of the tariff proceeds. Voters who are risk-adverse may 
prefer this situation to  free trade coupled with an uncertain redistribution 
scheme that could reduce their real income. Moreover, since it is ex- 
tremely expensive to levy an income tax that captures part of  the con- 
sumer surplus gains of just those who benefit from lower import prices, 
some voters might expect any income subsidy program to be financed 
through the progressive income tax system used to support most redis- 
tributive programs. Those who think they will lose on balance under this 
arrangement  will  tend  to  oppose  the  free  trade-income  subsidy 
approach, A politically appealing feature of  increasing the tariff to re- 
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who gain from cheaper imports pay the costs of  partially compensating 
those who are injured. 
Finally, losers from trade liberalization are likely to oppose exclusive 
reliance on direct income redistribution. Direct income transfers clearly 
separate the subsidized and productive parts of  one’s income-receiving 
activities and tend to demean the recipients. Price-increasing schemes do 
not seem to be as objectionable to beneficiaries on this ground, since the 
subsidy element is less transparent.  The greater transparency of  tax- 
financed subsidies to voters is another likely reason for opposition to the 
free trade-income  subsidy approach by  those who are injured by  free 
trade. Experience suggests that the duration of  voter support for this 
compensation method is likely to be less than under the tariff-raising 
approach. 
A political-economic analysis of import policy or any other public issue 
in which various second-best constraints are imposed does not, it should 
be stressed, mean that discussions of welfare-increasing policies are not 
longer relevant. Rent-seeking activities are themselves often regarded as 
a completely wasteful use of economic resources. However, in the politi- 
cal economy model outlined here where the absence of  perfect informa- 
tion is a key assumption and where rent-seeking activities mainly take the 
form  of  informational  expenditures  (rather  than,  say,  of  income- 
redistributing bribes), the matter is not as clear-cut as this. Some of the 
information provided may be socially valuable from a benefit-cost view- 
point, even though the self-interest goal of an industry leads it to present 
the  type  of  information  that  maximizes  its  likelihood  of  receiving 
pr~tection.’~  Nevertheless, the general public is unlikely to obtain the 
particular set of information it would prefer to receive from any given 
level of  informational outlays. Levying a tax on the industry’s informa- 
tion expenditures and spending the proceeds on the type of  information 
about the industry preferred by the general public would be an example 
of the kind of policy that could bring about a potential increase in welfare 
for the majority of  voters, who are outside the industry.Z*  Moreover, 
some industries that the community would want to assist if their economic 
conditions were better known may be unable to organize their members 
for the purpose of providing such information. As a result, the particular 
set of industries actually assisted may not be the ones that maximize the 
welfare of  the voting majority for any given magnitude of  information 
expenditures, even if  the expenditures made in each industry are of the 
type desired by the public. Other areas of policy interest involve devising 
fiscal and institutional mechanisms for selecting and financing the volume 
of information  expenditures that maximizes the community’s welfare 
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10.5  Empirical Results: A Review 
The industry characteristics that have been used in empirical efforts to 
account for industry differences in tariff rates (or changes in these rates) 
can be divided into three groups: (1) those that indicate the ability and 
willingness of  the productive factors employed in an industry to provide 
funds and other resources for lobbying efforts; (2) factors that reflect the 
willingness of  the majority of  voters and their elected representatives to 
grant protection; and (3) features that relate to the magnitude of  the 
benefits obtained from different levels of  (or increases in) protection.m 
The first set of  factors relate to the voter-support curve OtoV in figure 
10.3, which indicates the tariff increases voters would support at various 
levels of  lobbying expenditures. However, because  of  the free-rider 
problem associated with voluntary lobbying contributions, the feasible 
range  of  this curve for the particular  industry may be such that the 
optimum tariff increase cannot be attained. As mentioned earlier, the 
ability to overcome the free-rider problem and form a common interest 
group (thus extending the range of the voter-support curve beyond only 
minimum expenditure levels) is supposedly positively correlated with the 
degree of industry concentration and negatively related both to the size of 
the industry in terms of number of firms and to the degree of geographic 
dispersion. In addition, as Olson (1979) points out, usually a lobbying 
organization is not formed immediately-or, if  the organization already 
exists, resources are not forthcoming in significant amounts from the 
membershipupon the emergence  of  a  new  common interest for a 
group. A crisis or repeated series of  crises may be necessary to shock the 
individuals in the group into establishing the organization or increasing 
their contributions to it. To capture this effect such variables as growth 
conditions and the level of  (or, preferably, the change in) the import 
penetration ratio have been employed in various regression analyses. In 
general, the concentration ratio has not been significant in most studies. 
However, the number of firms, the import penetration ratio, and (espe- 
cially) measures of  growth perform better in the expected manner. 
When an industry is subject to greater import competition, the relative 
change in producer income caused by a given decline as well as the ability 
of capitalists and workers to move into alternative productive lines may 
also affect the willingness of  those in the industry to contribute to lob- 
bying efforts. The first effect is usually measured by the share of  value 
added in total output and the second by such variables as the average age 
of the workers, their average wages, an industry’s specialization ratio, 
and the share of capital income in value added. The value-added ratio has 
turned out as expected in some studies, while among the measures of 280  Robert E. Baldwin 
resource flexibility the average wages are almost always highly significant 
and the average age is significant in most instances. The other measures 
of  resource  flexibility do not  perform  as well.  Still another variable 
influencing the absolute size of lobbying expenditures by an established 
pressure  group  is  simply its size in terms of  the total income of  its 
members.  This variable  does not  turn  out  to be  significant in  most 
regression analyses. 
It should be  noted that several of  the variables affecting lobbying 
pressures by  domestic producers also influence counterlobbying pres- 
sures by both foreign producers and domestic consumers. However, the 
assumption is usually made that the impact of domestic producers domi- 
nates that of  the other two groups. 
Aside from the ability of an industry to undertake lobbying efforts, the 
shape of the voter-support curve depends upon the willingness of voters 
and their elected officials to grant import protection. For example, if 
voters  are particularly  sympathetic toward  low-income workers who 
suffer income losses and to those who have difficulty in  adjusting to 
income losses, one would expect that tariff rates would be higher (or 
GATT-related  tariff cuts less) in industries with relatively low wages, 
high proportions of unskilled workers, high average age of workers, etc. 
However, the higher the growth rate in these industries, the less favor- 
able is the voter likely to be  toward  a given tariff  increase in  such 
industries.  Because of  attitudes of  “fairness”  on  the part  of  voters, 
variables such as the level of import penetration as well as the particular 
reason for a sudden increase in imports, e.g., dumping, may also in- 
fluence the shape of the voter-support curve. Voter views on whether an 
industry’s decline jeopardizes some desirable national goal, e.g., national 
defense or foreign relations with an important foreign country, may also 
play a significant role in determining the nature of a voter-support curve. 
A selfish reason why voters may resist tariff increases is the fear that 
foreign tariff retaliation will decrease output in the industries where they 
are employed. Thus one expects increased protection for a particular 
industry to be easier to obtain if  only a few other industries are also 
pressing for import relief. Similarly, general tariff-cutting efforts by  a 
government are likely to be easier to undertake if other governments are 
also cutting their import duties. If  the majority of voters favor protection- 
ism primarily for selfish, long-run insurance purposes, one would expect 
this policy to operate mainly in industries where average wages are near 
those of the voters as a whole on the grounds that these are more similar 
to the industry for which the average voter wants insurance, namely, his 
own industry. 
The size of the industry in sales or employment terms is likely to affect 
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izes, for example, that when the foreign import supply curve is com- 
pletely elastic in an industry, the producer-surplus benefits obtained from 
a given import price rise are greater, the greater is the domestic industry’s 
supply. He may also be more willing to grant this price increase, the 
larger the number of  workers per dollar of increase in net benefits. On the 
other hand, the more significant the protected item is in his budget, the 
less ready is he likely to be to support increased duties. In addition, 
industry size influences the curve because of the voting strength of those 
employed in an industry itself, the magnitude of general tax revenues lost 
from the declining industry, and the existing degree of knowledge on the 
part  of  voters about the sector. The relations of  other industries, as 
import suppliers or output users, to the particular industry under consid- 
eration should also be considered in the context of the preceding factors. 
Among the variables included in the second group of factors influenc- 
ing the shape of  the voter-support curve, measures of human capital, such 
as average wages and the proportion of  unskilled workers, perform the 
best and, indeed, seem to be the most significant variables in the various 
studies taken as a whole. Tests of different international policy variables 
are not numerous enough to generalize, but Caves (1976) did find some 
support for Canada’s tariffs being related to their economic development 
goals. Fieleke (1976) on the other hand found that a national defense 
variable was not significant in accounting for the United States tariff 
structure. Industry size as measured by number of  employees is signifi- 
cant in the expected manner in some of  the studies. 
Though not included thus far in any of the regression analyses, various 
factors relating the ability of elected officials to deviate from the prefer- 
ences of  the voters (and still get reelected) could also be included as 
influences on the shape of  the curve indicating the support of  decision 
makers for tariff increases. 
The magnitude of the industry benefits from different levels of protec- 
tion or increases in protective levels, i.e., the position of  the producer 
benefits curve OQS  in figure 10.3,  depends on the elasticity of  the indus- 
try’s short-run supply curve, the level of  output from which tariff in- 
creases are being considered, and any other supply curve shifts due to 
factors other than the initial downward pressure on price. If, for example, 
productive factors are completely immobile in the short run, the short- 
run supply curve will be vertical and the benefits curve will therefore be 
steeper up to the tariff increase that restores the initial price. This will 
raise the equilibrium tariff level ceteris parib~s.~~  As already noted, the 
degree of  factor  mobility can be  measured  by  such variables as the 
average wages in an industry, the average age of its employees or, if  one 
considers capital to be more immobile than labor, capital’s income share, 
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Furthermore, the higher the degree  of  product  specialization in  the 
industry the more likely it is that a higher proportion of the factors in the 
industry will be immobile in the short run. 
Since a given percentage increase in domestic supply in response to a 1 
percent increase in price will increase producer surplus by a larger sum if 
the initial output level is large, the slope of  the benefits curve is also 
related to the industry’s output level. While short-run shifts in the domes- 
tic demand curve will not affect the short-run benefits of  a given tariff 
increase in cases where the foreign supply curve is perfectly elastic, these 
shifts will have an independent price effect when this curve is less than 
perfectly elastic. An increasing demand curve will add to the short-run 
benefits of  a given tariff increase. Still another factor of  this type is the 
extent  to which  producers in  an industry  own  comparable  facilities 
abroad that export either back to the home country or to third countries. 
In the latter case the producers do not wish to set off tariff increases in 
their export markets. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, it is difficult to find variables that 
enable one to discriminate among different hypotheses concerning the 
reason for interindustry differences in protectionism. Should, for exam- 
ple, the fact that protectionism is comparatively high in industries with 
comparatively low per worker levels of  human capital be interpreted as 
support for the hypothesis that voters behave in an altruistic manner or 
for the hypothesis that, because of their poorer adjustment ability, low- 
income groups are more likely to overcome the free-rider problem that 
tends to limit lobbying efforts? Moreover, quite aside from interindustry 
differences in voter attitudes or  in the free-rider problem, the equilibrium 
tariff increase after a given decline in the foreign supply curve will be 
greater if  low levels of human capital are associated with inelastic short- 
run industry supply curves. One way in which the first two hypotheses 
might be disentangled would be to determine whether per capita lobbying 
resources, in terms of money, letter-writing efforts, and other measures 
of political pressures, on the part of low-wage workers are in fact greater 
than for high-wage workers in response to a given decline in income. 
Furthermore, it might be possible to separate the last hypothesis from the 
others by introducing measures of  short-run supply elasticity as well as 
average wages into the regressions. 
Most  of  the other variables mentioned also can be  interpreted  as 
affecting both curves in figure 10.3. The direction of their impact on tariff 
levels is generally the same, but again existing analyses do not enable one 
to discriminate among the underlying forces for which these variables 
serve as proxies. Yet, if  one of  the objectives of such investigations is to 
suggest policies or institutional changes that will increase welfare in the 
second-best world of  trade-policy formation, the ability to make such 
distinctions is essential. The possibility of succeeding  in this regard would 283  Political Economy of  Protectionism 
seem to require greater efforts to determine the various separate rela- 
tionships that make up a total model of the political economy of  protec- 
tionism. 
Notes 
1. The most famous United States historical study along these lines is Taussig (1931). See 
2. Several of  the articles will be discussed in the text, while all are’listed  in the references 
3.  Samuelson (1947, p. 221). 
4.  Bergson (1968 reprint, p. 413). 
5. Bergson (1968 reprint, p. 413). 
6. Arrow (1%3, p. 71). 
7. Samuelson (1956, p.  15). 
8. Arrow (1963, p. 18). 
9. Arrow (1963, p. 23). 
10. Arrow (1963, p.  106). 
11.  It has also been pointed out by Coase (1960) that with these conditions  some market 
failures, e.g.,  certain externalities, will  be corrected through private contracts without 
requiring any government intervention. 
also Schnattschneider (1935). 
at the end of  the paper. 
12. Arrow (1963, p. 74). 
13. The only redistribution generally mentioned relates to the tariff proceeds, and this is 
not brought into a discussion of  attracting additional votes. 
14. If workers pursue their self-interest, they will raise tariffs to the levels that eliminate 
trade. In fact, they could even lobby for export subsidies. 
15. See Brock and Magee (1974) for a modeling of some of  Olson’s  concepts  in terms of a 
noncooperative game. 
16. One could say that, in these cases, the cost of lobbying is low because it is marginal to 
a public-good activity already in place. 
17. However, the question of  what is a “significant section” of  the community here can 
depend, in a pluralistic democracy, on  lobbying by the section itself, so that it is not clear 
that the explanation of  protection provided by  resort to such a notion as Corden’s is truly 
independent of the kind of explanation resulting from public-choice  theory based wholly on 
self-interest. 
18. If  the individual‘s  welfare increases, the relationship is one of  envy rather than 
altruism. 
19. Arrow (1975, p.  17). Arrow is discussing the reasons why people give blood to 
individuals they do not personally know. 
20.  One of the hypotheses tested by Caves on  Canadian data is that there is “a collective 
national preference for industrialization while  also promoting prairie settlement and a 
national transportation system.” Caves (1976, p. 279). 
21.  The diagram assumes the necessary convexities  for an interior maximum, of course. 
22.  If the industry is initially in a tariff equilibrium position but the voters change their 
views and agree upon  a general tariff-cutting  rule under a GATT-sponsored trade negotia- 
tion, the point Or,  can be interpreted as the tariff increment above the formula cut that 
minimizes the industry’s losses relative to its initial income level. 
23.  If the absolute slope of  the voter support curve is less at all points than the absolute 
slope of the non-horizontal  portion of  the benefits curve, a prohibitive  duty will be imposed. 284  Robert E. Baldwin 
24.  In the narrow self-interest model where voters are in effect tricked into permitting 
increased protectionism, it is much more likely that the protection to an industry will decline 
as voters gain experience from repeated  “plays” of  this political “game.” 
25.  Lobbying-determined tariffs are analyzed, in explicit models, by Findlay and Wellisz 
(chapter 8) and Feenstra and Bhagwati (chapter 9) in this volume. In fact, Feenstra and 
Bhagwati develop benefits and costs curves much like those in figure 10.3. 
26.  See Richardson (chapter  12 here) and Neumann (1979). 
27.  The appropriability  problem  may prevent  this information from being provided 
through the private market mechanism. 
28.  Since these voters would have the option to ask for the same type of  information the 
industry  would  have  furnished  with  the  taxed  funds,  the  ability  to select  a  different 
information set provides the opportunity for a potential welfare increase. 
29.  Since the 1930s the average tariff level for dutiable manufactures has decreased very 
significantly in the industrial countries. For example, in the United States the ratio of  duties 
collected to the value of  dutiable imports declined from 59 percent in 1932 to 10 percent in 
1970. Consequently, existing interindustry differences in tariff rates are closely related to 
the ability of  industries to resist the general downward pressure on tariffs. 
30.  Presumably in the initial position the marginal benefits of a tariff increase are less 
than the lobbying expenditures needed to achieve the tariff increase. 
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Most blind men who have examined the elephant of  political economy 
have come away with different impressions of the animal. My substantial 
Stephen P. Magee is the McDermott Professor of Finance at the University of  Texas at 
Austin. He is the author of International Trade and Distortions in Factor Markets (Marcel- 
Dekker, 1976) and International Trade (Addison-Wesley, 1980). 287  Political Economy of  Protectionism 
agreement with Baldwin’s  views leads me to  worry that we are either both 
looking through a glass darkly or both specializing  in the same corner of 
the beast. Since there are so many areas of agreement, this discussion will 
be limited to the few issues on which we disagree. 
Baldwin is skeptical, and properly so, about the Downsian view that 
competitive markets plus efficient political bribing lead to Pareto opti- 
mality. He does a nice job of relaxing the rather restrictive assumptions of 
this model in the process of  attempting to explain tariffs. He is overly 
optimistic, however, in his reintroduction of  social values and interper- 
sonal effects.  The Corden  “conservative welfare function,” Arrow’s 
“altruism,” and the Phelps “generalized regard for human rights” models 
all culminate in the “insurance theory of tariffs.” According to this view, 
government policy on protection provides an insurance policy for risk- 
averse economic agents. The result is back-door Downsianism: Pareto 
optimality somehow emerges from rent seeking by protectionist and free 
trade forces. To my  way of  thinking,  this approach places excessive 
credence in the potential optimality of  rent seeking. There are seven 
reasons why I believe that this “public welfare view of tariff setting” is a 
myth. 
First, such a view can be defended by appeal to the Coase theorem. 
When applied to the tariff problem, the theorem asserts that with well- 
defined property rights, competitive rent seeking by pro- and antitariff 
forces will lead to Pareto optimality. The fallacy in this view is the failure 
to see that the legal rules of  the game themselves are established by a 
rent-seeking process. If  there are differential costs to groups in setting up 
the rules of the game, we will observe subsequent competition on issues 
such as protection resulting in one group in society gaining less than other 
groups give up. 
Second, political markets in information are notoriously imperfect. 
Successful politicians are frequently those most capable of distorting the 
views of their opponents to voters: Lyndon Johnson’s characterization of 
Goldwater and Richard Nixon’s description of  Richard McGovern are 
cases in point. The manifestation of this behavior in United States discus- 
sions of  protectionism  is  illustrated  by  the protectionist  appeal that 
“tariffs protect jobs.” Protectionists do not advertise that tariffs in the 
United States protect lousy jobs at the expense of good jobs, just as free 
traders fail to mention that United States tariffs are progressive, benefit- 
ing low-wage labor. 
Third, Baldwin feels that one failure of  elected representatives is that 
they do  not always act in the interest of voters. Though Baldwin discusses 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem earlier, he should have mentioned it here 
since some patterns  of  underlying preferences make it impossible to 
determine the “interest of  voters.”  A related point is that there are 
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likely the parties are to sell distortionary policies to well-organized in- 
terest groups. The proceeds of such sales are used to improve the party’s 
chances of  election (see Brock and Magee 1980). 
Fourth, there are empirically indistinguishable alternatives to the in- 
surance theory of tariffs as explanations of both old industries and indus- 
tries with market power. The low opportunity costs of lobbying activity 
for low-wage labor and factors in markets with distortions suggest why we 
would see protection in  these industries. Furthermore,  the insurance 
theory is better applied to dumping laws than to tariffs. The theory would 
suggest that we should observe the rapid application of temporary protec- 
tion to industries in which unanticipated changes have occurred in world 
prices. Unfortunately for the theory, (1)  this occurrence is also explained 
by the low opportunity cost of  lobbying for unemployed resources and (2) 
the protection is seldom temporary. 
Fifth, the insurance model cannot explain why political markets appear 
to prefer voluntary export restraints by foreigners as first-best, quotas as 
second-best, tariffs as third-best, production subsidy as fourth-best, and 
labor subsidy as fifth-best when unexpected price changes cause wages to 
fall in certain sectors. Bhagwati (1971) showed that exactly the reverse 
ranking would hold if  the system were operating on the basis of welfare 
efficiency. The view Brock and I have developed is that redistributive 
policies are the prices which clear political markets between competing 
groups. Each party  selects policies which maximize its probability of 
election. In equilibrium, they will have balanced the marginal positive 
effects of  the resources they collect against the negative general voter 
effect emanating from the general disaffection the distortionary policy 
generates. This means that each party will  select a policy achieving 
redistribution which is the most indirect and difficult for the voters to 
understand. 
Sixth, I think an underemphasized explanation of protection is that it 
protects distortionary rents which have been developed through local 
monopoly power. If  the steel industry is imperfectly competitive and 
earns supernormal profits, labor unions attempt to force management to 
share these rents. The result is high wages, unionization, and barriers to 
entry in the factor market for this industry. When imports threaten to 
reduce the output of  the domestic steel industry, the monopoly profits 
accruing to management and the distorted wage differentials earned by 
labor stimulate both factors to act in concert. The distortions reduce the 
mobility of  factors in  as well  as out of  the industry.  This generates 
Cairnesian-type lobbying behavior rather than the more traditional Stol- 
per-Samuelson lobbying. Stolper and Samuelson suggest that all capital 
would be, say, for free trade while all labor would be for protection (or 
vice versa): their main point is that some labor should not be for protec- 
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versus the Stolper-Samuelson approach indicates that nineteen out of 
twenty-one  industries  lobbying on the President’s trade bill in  1973 
followed the Cairnesian approach (Magee 1980a). In a two-factor world, 
if  we plot the positions of capital and labor in a 2 x 2 table, we should find 
all of  the observations in the diagonal cells if  the world behaves in a 
Cairnesian  (noncompeting  group) fashion.  If  the  Stolper-Samuelson 
model is correct, all the observations would be in one of  the two off- 
diagonal cells. Notice in figure C10.1 that nineteen of  the twenty-one 
industries studied  fell along the diagonal, which  rejects the  Stolper- 
Samuelson model. 
Seventh (and finally), competitive political markets show considerably 
more concern over redistribution  than over the social welfare issues. 
What is best for society is much less important than which groups in 
society can most effectively channel their desire for larger amounts of 
income into effective political clout. Analysis of  United States tariffs on 
directly competitive imports in 1971 indicates that the social costs are 
only about 7 percent of  the consumer loss. Furthermoie, when the stakes 
are high on both sides (for free traders and protectionists) and when 
elections are close, large amounts of resources can be channeled into rent 
seeking with considerable loss (see Magee 1980b). 
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To summarize, the issue in competitive rent seeking is whether virtue 
and optimality emerge or whether the economy is shoved toward a black 
hole. While some may argue that the horse race is a close one, I’ll put my 
money on the sow’s ear over the silk purse. 
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Comment  Stanislaw Wellisz 
In recent years trade economists’ interests have increasingly shifted from 
welfare economics to the political economy of trade and protection. The 
older line of inquiry dealt primarily with comparative statics and focused 
on the first best, while admitting obstacles to its achievement.’ The newer 
one concentrates on adjustment processes and is the economics of  the 
second best par excellence. More important perhaps is the treatment of 
the  institutional  framework.  Trade  economists  (Marxians excepted) 
tended to treat institutions as a datum. They now attempt to endogenize 
the trade regime by modeling the political process. Baldwin, who himself 
made important contributions to the welfare discussion,’ now gives us an 
excellent survey of  the political economy of  trade. The survey brings 
together many strands of  thought, clarifies difficult issues (I especially 
appreciate the lucid interpretation of Brock and Magee), and provides a 
valuable background to the papers presented at this conference. 
Baldwin starts by comparing the Bergson-Samuelson with the Arrow 
social welfare function. The former treats social welfare as an ordering of 
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individual utilities performed by a grand ranker with his own preferences, 
The latter views social welfare as a mapping from individual to aggregate 
preferences. The inherent  difficulties of  these formulations need not 
detain us here. It may be worthwhile to point out, however, that the 
former corresponds to the conception of the government as a guardian of 
public interest, whereas under the latter the government is merely an 
executor of  the resultant of  individual or collective pressures. 
The distinction between the two concepts of the social welfare function 
helps clarify some of the models discussed by Baldwin. Thus we may pose 
ethical questions to a Bergson-Samuelson type of government, but not to 
one of the Arrow type; conversely, we may ask how voting, lobbying, or 
for that matter the use of force explains the actions of the latter, but not of 
the former. But too much discussion of  the nature of the social welfare 
function is counterproductive. It is idle to speculate why some interests 
helped by changes in trade patterns favor redistribution in favor of those 
who are hurt by  the change. Those willing to give might be genuinely 
altruistic, or the poverty of  others might constitute for them a negative 
externality, or they might follow an insurance principle (their “altruism” 
will be reciprocated in case of need), or maybe they think that if  they do 
not yield a little voluntarily, more will be taken from them by  force. 
Clearly, speculation as to the motives does not help our understanding or 
ability to predict the outcome. 
The most significant progress made by the political economists of trade 
does not result from speculation about the nature of  welfare functions, 
but from the consideration of problems affecting specific interest groups. 
The familiar 2 x 2 model tells us that if changes in trade patterns help one 
factor (such as capital), they are likely to hurt another (such as labor). 
Such a broad formulation throws little light on the pattern of  interest 
groups in a world in which there is human as well as physical capital and 
where, in the short run, either type of capital may be highly specific. The 
new analysis helps us understand why, often, capital, management, and 
labor engaged in a given industry join forces in lobbying for or against 
protection. In the long run United States capital (or is it labor?) will 
benefit from increased foreign car competition. Right now the owners of 
specific capital employed in that industry, which means the stockholders, 
and various kinds of labor, including management and union leaders, are 
hurt: owners of  specific factors do unite. 
By the same token economists have retreated from policy descriptions 
derived from  analytically illuminating, but overly simplified, models. 
Thus the maximization of  social welfare subject to the constraint that 
employment of a factor be maintained on a specific level (or, by the same 
token, that the income of a specific factor be maintained on a given level) 
leads to the conclusion that a tax-cum-subsidy  scheme is superior to tariff 
~rotection.~  Now that the United States government is taking such direct 292  Robert E. Baldwin 
compensatory steps (many other governments have done so before, and 
failed) we begin to  realize how difficult it is to determine in practice who is 
hurt by changes in trade patterns. 
Direct subsidization leads to a host of  difficulties which can be broadly 
subsumed under the moral hazard label. The reliance on old-fashioned 
trade restraints, for all the inefficiencies they create, at least avoids that 
difficulty. 
For all the progress we  have made, our knowledge of  the political 
economy of  trade is still in  its infancy. The observed pattern of  trade 
restraints is compatible with any number of  hypotheses concerning the 
nature of  political processes. The reality, which has so long eluded the 
analysis of political scientists, has yet to yield its secrets to the investiga- 
tion of  economists armed with more powerful analytic tools. Likewise, 
our understanding of  specific restrictive measures is also rather weak. 
When confronted with the question, why tariffs, or why quotas, or why 
voluntary restrictions, we beat a hasty retreat from analytic to common- 
sense explanations. Yet if  we hope to improve policy-and,  after all, we 
are all moralists at heart-we  should have a clear understanding of  the 
factors dictating the current practice. 
Baldwin’s survey is doubly valuable: it shows what we have accom- 
plished and what is yet to be done. We may be humbled by how little we 
have accomplished, but, unlike Alexander, we  need not despair that 
nothing is left to conquer. 
Notes 
1. For a classic statement, see Samuelson (1962). 
2. In particular,  see Baldwin (1952, 1953-54). 
3.  For an elegant proof of  such propositions, see Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969). 
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